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Alfred the Great and Ceolwulf II

The Relationship between King Alfred
the Great and Ceolwulf II of Mercia
(874-c.879)
Brent Weisberg, University of Pennsylvania

Introduction
Studying King Ceolwulf II of Mercia presents one
with a situation not unlike the one former US Secretary of
Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld’s described concerning American
intelligence work in Iraq in 2002: "there are known knowns…
there are known unknowns… but there are also unknown
unknowns."1 The "known knowns" of Ceolwulf ’s reign are
few and far between. All we have to bear witness to the life and
legacy of Ceolwulf, the last independent ruler of Mercia, are two
charters of his, a few mentions in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle as
well as two of its likely derivatives, and several dozen coins.2 The
few coins we have, particularly examples of Two Emperors type
coins from the recent Watlington hoard find, provide material
evidence of Ceolwulf ’s reign that may be used to corroborate or
contravene literary evidence.3 I shall seek to elucidate the history
of Ceolwulf that I discern to be most plausible through the lens
of his relationships with King Alfred of Wessex and the Vikings.
My aim is to identify the shadowy figure of King Ceolwulf II of
Mercia from the way he affected his contemporaries in the arena
of late-ninth-century power politics.
An overview of the debate in the secondary literature
regarding Alfred’s narrative sources is vital because these sources
underpin any construction of Ceolwulf ’s history. These sources
grant a few choice glimpses into Ceolwulf ’s reign that neither
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documentary nor numismatic sources can transmit. An issue
arises from the fact that these sources were almost certainly the
work of agents within the kingdom of Ceolwulf ’s contemporary,
King Alfred of Wessex. As Davis wrote, a central issue the historian
faces in working on the period of Alfred’s reign (871-99) is "the
possibility that almost all the sources may have originated with
either Alfred himself or his immediate entourage."4 By contrast,
we have no equivalent narrative records from Ceolwulf ’s
kingdom to give us more direct insight into the Mercian king’s
actions or attitudes toward either Alfred or the Vikings. This lack
of sources forces us to examine the narrative of Ceolwulf ’s reign
through West Saxon eyes. We must attempt to determine the
purposes behind the creation of the Chronicle and Asser’s Life for
further discussion of the sources’ entries concerning Ceolwulf.
A discussion of Æthelweard’s motivation for creating his own
version of the Chronicle and the attempt to translate the Old
English original into a Latin version about a century after the
former’s publication would probably merit its own dissertation,
but this will instead be touched on briefly in a subsequent
section.5
Davis, Whitelock, and Keynes espoused different views
regarding the origins and purposes of the Alfredian narrative
sources. I find a combination of Whitelock and Keynes’ arguments
most convincing regarding the possible origins and purposes
of the Chronicle and its derivatives. Davis wrote that Alfred
probably had a direct hand in the production of the Chronicle
and intended it to serve a propagandist purpose. He suggested
that we should view Alfred’s narrative sources as items full of
exaggerations of accomplishments and omissions of blunders
toward a goal of inflating Alfred’s triumphs and mitigating his
disasters. He argued that Alfred’s concurrent efforts to convince
his contemporaries to work on his kingdom-wide projects of
building fortresses and improving learning underscores this
explanation’s probability.6 The upshot of this interpretation
for the study of Ceolwulf would be to treat all mention of the
10
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Mercian king with the utmost scepticism on the grounds that his
own story may have been refashioned to fit the narrative Alfred
sought to push. Toward a more holistic view in considering the
Alfredian narrative sources’ origins, Whitelock countered Davis
by arguing that the works served broader purposes more suited to
their genre. After all, Alfred would have had other means, like the
coins that proclaim his control of London, to issue propagandist
messages.7 Whitelock further argued based on her assumption
of the Chronicle’s intended audience that it would have been
impractical for the compilers to introduce misleading content.
She questioned how much Alfred "could get away with" when
the work’s audience, the literate ecclesiastics and nobles of Alfred’s
era of learning, would have lived through the events themselves.8
She also argued that there were significant grounds to believe the
sources originated from Alfred’s court but differed from Davis
in denying Alfred’s direct involvement. Thus, Whitelock argued,
Alfred should be viewed not as "Alfred ‘the propagandist’" but
rather as "Alfred veredicus ‘truth-teller’—an epithet given him by
Asser, who knew him."9 Combined with Keynes’ argument that
the Chronicle was possibly intended to promote a pan-AngloSaxon identity among the people under Alfred’s (as opposed
to Danish) control in the 890s, Whitelock’s view of the AngloSaxon Chronicle allows an interpretation of its contents as they
relate to Ceolwulf as largely faithful to reality. If we believe that
the work was composed in Alfred’s court and intended for a
literate audience of Alfred’s officials, it appears too probable that
they would have balked at outright falsehoods, at least barring
negative characterisations of their perceived enemies in ways that
would have accommodated willing suspension of disbelief. In
summary, the view of the Alfredian narrative sources that I will
use in this paper is that Alfred probably commissioned the AngloSaxon Chronicle, the work on which Æthelweard’s Chronicle
and Asser’s Life are based, to be crafted by scholars in his court
toward a goal of a unified narrative whose scope encompassed
the newly conceived Anglo-Saxon kingdom. I also will argue
Penn History Review
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a case describing Ceolwulf ’s relationships with Alfred and the
Vikings from the standpoint that the contents of the Chronicle
and its derivatives probably complied with their contemporary
audience’s memory, even if they feature selective inclusion and
omission as well as misleading characterizations such as reference
to Ceolwulf as "a foolish king’s thegn."10
The secondary literature discussion of Ceolwulf ’s reign
itself locates mainly in the work of Haslam, Blackburn, and
Keynes. Keynes provided a balanced and even set of arguments,
and I use his findings in my analysis of the relationship between
Ceolwulf and Alfred as well as between Ceolwulf and the Vikings.
However, Keynes did not touch directly on the relationship
between Ceolwulf and the Vikings. My use of Keynes will
be modified by insights drawn from the recently discovered
Watlington hoard, which fills in gaps in the corpus of numismatic
evidence from the period and possibly supports his suspicions
regarding the Two Emperors type coinage.11 Blackburn provided
a view of the relationship between Alfred and Ceolwulf through
coinage, and his conclusions have been in part controverted
by the Watlington hoard discovery, which has significantly
augmented the corpus of coins from the period.12 In modifying
the numismatic conclusions both scholars make, I will pay
particular attention to the expanded corpus of Two Emperors type
coins. Writing after Keynes, Haslam built a detailed model of
Ceolwulf ’s reign through analysis of the events of the years 87486. The primary sources it rested on, however, do not provide
sufficient grounds to construct a sequence of events with as much
conviction as Haslam did. The bottom line is that Haslam’s
argument is too self-reinforcing and lacks enough convergently
supportive sources to deem his chronology more than a possible
sequence of events within the multiplicity of such sequences one
could construct.13

12
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Watlington Hoard

Ceolwulf and Alfred
Given the nature of available sources regarding Ceolwulf,
I shall present his relationship with Alfred as it evolved from
c.874 to c.879 according to the three points of rupture that I
have identified. Documentary and numismatic evidence shall
serve to augment, temper, or link the accounts given by the
Chronicle and its derivatives. The first point of rupture in the
period was the Vikings’ 874 elevation of Ceolwulf to the Mercian
throne, the second was the 877 division of Mercia between the
Vikings and Ceolwulf, and the third was the battle of Edington
and Ceolwulf ’s subsequent disappearance from the historical
record. I argue that there are grounds to consider the relationship
between Alfred and Ceolwulf as one at least of somewhat positive
relations in the period between c.874 and c.877 but that the
relationship altered decisively in 877 as the sharing of Mercia
forced Ceolwulf to affirm his role as a partner to the Vikings.
Furthermore, I argue that there is insufficient information to
determine Alfred and Ceolwulf's relationship in the aftermath of
the battle of Edington.
At first glance, the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle and its
derivatives’ characterisation of Ceolwulf suggests a consistently
negative relationship between the two kings. However, viewed
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alongside numismatic and documentary evidence, as well as the
assumption that the sources’ attestations of Ceolwulf ’s actions
are consistent with reality, these sources suggest a dynamic
relationship that possibly began as a somewhat positive one. The
Chronicle’s 874 entry described Ceolwulf ’s appointment to the
kingdom of the Mercians through an agreement with the Vikings
and called him "a foolish king’s thegn," giving the impression that
Ceolwulf was beholden to his Viking superiors and ruled merely
with their consent.14 However, documentary sources suggest that
Alfred viewed him as a contemporary ruler while Ceolwulf was
in power. To explain these conflicting views, one must examine
the Chronicle in the context of the 890s, where the work appears
to portray the events of the 870s through the lens of Alfred’s
goals and ambitions in the former decade. Pratt argued that
Alfred’s treatment of Ceolwulf in the Chronicle reflects Alfred’s
intention of furthering his projects of enhancing learning among
his officials and constructing fortifications across his kingdom.15
Pratt pointed to Alfred’s literary contributions in the form of
his preface to St Gregory’s Pastoral Care, among other works, to
suggest that the 890s were a time in which the West Saxon king
created "a distinctive Alfredian language of wealth and wisdom"
in which Alfred engaged in a kind of "performance" as a king
in the moulds of Solomon and the ideal ruler as described by
St Gregory.16 Pratt argued that Ceolwulf, a king who had failed
to secure a lasting rule, possibly made an effective foil within
Alfred’s new discourse "portraying wisdom as the sole criterion
for office-holding."17 In addition, establishing Ceolwulf as an
unqualified ruler who lost his throne as a result of his lack of
wisdom may have reinforced the idea that Alfred’s officials owed
their positions of power to their connection to the projects of
Alfred, from whom wealth and wisdom flowed. Pratt pointed
to Asser’s account of the king’s offer of "a stark choice between
loss of office and more attentive study" as a prime example of
Alfred’s possible use of a "language of wealth and wisdom" to
shape his kingdom according to the Solomonic and Gregorian
14
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archetypes.18 Additionally, Keynes wrote that the Chronicle’s
denigration of Ceolwulf was probably designed to appease
Ceolwulf ’s successor, Ealdorman Æthelred, whom it is perhaps
unlikely Ceolwulf was related to.19 Therefore, there are significant
grounds to view the Chronicle’s characterization of Ceolwulf
as a retroactive assessment of the Mercian king’s legacy to suit
Alfredian purposes. This possible effort to smear Ceolwulf amid
the political realities of the 890s, however, does not eliminate the
possibility that the actions that the Chronicle ascribes Ceolwulf
themselves had a basis in actual political developments.
The addition of documentary and numismatic sources
provides a clearer picture of Ceolwulf ’s reign and may help to put
the contents of the Chronicle and its derivatives into perspective.
The few charters that survive from Ceolwulf ’s reign augment the
narrative sources in a meaningful way by granting choice glances
into how Ceolwulf probably chose to portray himself and his
rule to his subjects and contemporaries. An 875 charter, where
Ceolwulf absolved the diocese of Worcester "from feeding the
king’s horses and those who lead them" made no mention of
King Alfred nor the Vikings in its witness list. Additionally,
Ceolwulf referred to himself as "king of the Mercians" in the
body of the charter as well as at the top of the witness list.20 These
aspects of the charter suggest that Ceolwulf presented himself as
a king in his own right and did not acknowledge requirement
on his part of Viking permission to grant land and privileges.
In other Anglo-Saxon charters, non-kings who wished to grant
land or privileges had to do so with the express permission of
the king. Additionally, as Blackburn pointed out, this charter’s
witness list includes many of the same bishops and temporal
office-holders of western Mercia who had attested the charters of
Ceolwulf ’s predecessor, King Burgred of Mercia.21 This apparent
continuity in office-holders’ support from Burgred to Ceolwulf
makes it appear likely that Ceolwulf ’s contemporaries, notably
Alfred, viewed Ceolwulf as a king in his own right in the wake of
his accession to the Mercian throne.
Penn History Review
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Numismatic evidence that probably dates from the period
after Ceolwulf ’s 874 accession and before his sharing of Mercia
with the Vikings in 877 suggests that he enjoyed at least neutral
and possibly friendly relations with Alfred in this period. Whereas
Blackburn and Keynes argued that the available numismatic
evidence supported the view that London recognized Alfred as
its ruler in the first few years after King Burgred’s deposition and
Ceolwulf ’s ascension, new evidence from the Watlington hoard
suggests Alfred and Ceolwulf jointly issued coinage like the Two
Emperors type earlier than previously estimated.22 By extension,
the nature of Alfred and Ceolwulf ’s relationship in this first period
possibly developed toward one of neutrality or at least some
kind of cooperation earlier than previously considered. Precisely
dating the coin types involved in this analysis is impossible, but
it is possible to estimate when each type was issued. The Lunettes
type, which Alfred issued jointly with King Burgred through the
London mint, was probably discontinued shortly after Burgred’s
deposition, as Blackburn suggested.23 He also pointed to the
corpus of Cross-and-Lozenge type coins as indicative of a possible
shift in the control of London from Alfred to Ceolwulf around
the 877 sharing of Mercia. The progression of styles in the corpus
of Cross-and-Lozenge types that he had access to, he argued,
suggested that the same moneyers struck coins for Alfred and
then Ceolwulf but did not do so concurrently.24 Additionally,
Blackburn dated the restoration of fineness observed in the
Cross-and-Lozenge type to c.875-6 because, without hindsight, it
appeared "between 875 and 877… the Danes had been bought off
and Alfred might reasonably have thought that his worst troubles
were behind him."25 For his part, Blackburn did not make a case
for the political implications of the Two Emperors type.26 The first
portion of Blackburn’s argument, that the Cross-and-Lozenge type
may indicate that London was in Alfred’s sole possession until
c.877, does not hold up in the light of newer Watlington hoard
evidence that increases the corpus of Two Emperors type coins
from just two examples to fifteen.27 The discovery of these coins
16
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allows for ascribing the kind of importance neither Keynes nor
Blackburn dared grant the two coins that they were aware of.
This coinage type predates the Cross-and-Lozenge type because
it is of a lesser fineness than the rebased Cross-and-Lozenge type
and, like the rebased type, features each king on separate coins
from the same London moneyers.28 Here I agree with Blackburn’s
argument that it is possible that Alfred’s rebasement of the coinage
happened c.875-6 during what may have appeared to the West
Saxons as a period of long respite from Viking attack.29 Keynes
agreed, again with only the two then-known examples of the
Two Emperors type to go on, with the more conservative period
of c.875-c.878.30 This possible date of rebasement would then
place the Two Emperors type in the period between the c.874
deposition of Burgred and the c.875-6 issuance of the first Crossand-Lozenge type coins. Thus, it is possible that Alfred shared
control of London with Ceolwulf until at least c.875-6. The
picture of the period c.874 to c.877 that the current numismatic
evidence appears to point to is that the monetary union that
almost certainly existed between Alfred and Burgred, evidenced
in the Lunettes type, continued in the form of the Two Emperors
and Cross-and-Lozenge types once Ceolwulf was secure enough in
his position as king of Mercia to exert influence over London’s
moneyers. This union was probably strong to implement a
reform as large as the rebasement of the joint coinage type in
the form of the Cross-and-Lozenge type, suggesting a certain level
of accommodation and cooperation between the two kings in
the period. The nature of the two kings’ working relationship
in this period may have been one of a greater and lesser partner,
as Keynes suggested, pointing to coins from the types the kings
jointly minted on which Alfred is styled "rex A" and "rex S M,"
which Keynes argued should be interpreted as "rex A(nglorum)"
and "rex S(axonum et) M(erciorum)."31 These suggestions are
compelling, and it does appear possible that the kings at least
nominally observed a relationship that portrayed Alfred as the
superior partner and Ceolwulf the inferior partner.
Penn History Review
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Narrative and numismatic evidence provide grounds to
support the view that the aftermath of the 877 peace at Exeter and
the ensuing sharing of Mercia led to a realignment in the political
structure of southern England and, consequently, represented
an inflection point in Alfred and Ceolwulf ’s relationship. The
877 sharing of Mercia between Ceolwulf and the Vikings may
have entailed a change in Alfred and Ceolwulf ’s relationship in
that the Viking demand to divide the kingdom probably forced
Ceolwulf to pick a side between Alfred and his Danish overlords.
This side-selection may be reflected in numismatic evidence
that points to the possibility that Ceolwulf was the sole ruler
of London, having excluded Alfred, after 877 and at least up to
the battle of Edington. For his part, Ceolwulf may have felt he
had no choice, as the 874 entry in the Chronicle relates: when
the Vikings elevated Ceolwulf to the Mercian throne, the new
king "swore oaths to them and gave hostages, that [the kingdom]
should be ready for them on whatever day they wished to have it,
and he would be ready, himself and all who would follow him, at
the enemy’s service."32
The Alfred-Guthrum treaty, which Keynes estimated
to c.880-90, after Ceolwulf ’s potential 879 demise and before
Guthrum’s death in 890, may provide indirect evidence of the
aftermath of the 877 sharing of Mercia.33 That is, the terms of the
treaty dividing southern England between Alfred and Guthrum’s
Vikings roughly cut Mercia in half, granting to Guthrum the
territory the Vikings probably settled in 877 and granting to
Alfred the territory Ceolwulf probably had retained from 877
onward.34 Taking together the terms of the treaty and the 877
Chronicle entry points to a separation of Mercia into two discrete
parts: one in the southwest including London ruled by Ceolwulf
and one in the northeast ruled by the Vikings. Æthelweard’s
account of 877 may provide insight into why Ceolwulf chose
to go along with the Vikings in the sharing of Mercia and
exclusion of Alfred from London. He reported that the Vikings
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"ravaged the kingdom of the Mercians" in 877.35 The Vikings
possibly conducted this ravaging of Ceolwulf ’s lands to maintain
overlordship over the king in the aftermath of a series of Viking
reverses at Alfred’s hands over the course of 876 and 877. The
possibility that Æthelweard may have conflated Viking ravaging,
or mistaken ravaging in Mercia with Viking ravaging elsewhere
should be dismissed. Æthelweard almost certainly had access
to sources that we do not have the privilege of interacting with
today, wrote just a generation or two beyond the reach of living
memory of the events of Ceolwulf ’s reign, and created his own
Chronicle as a scholarly exercise to translate the original AngloSaxon Chronicle into Latin. Therefore, it is difficult to believe that
he would have embellished the truth about the events of 877.
However, Æthelweard’s placement of the single instance of landsharing in his Chronicle in 875 was probably a chronological
mistake.36 It is likely that the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, with its
own singular instance of Viking land-sharing during Ceolwulf ’s
reign, is more consistent with reality.37 Thus, there are grounds to
conclude that Ceolwulf sided with the Vikings in 877 and exerted
power over London to Alfred’s exclusion. Here, the second part of
Blackburn’s chronology is compatible with the Cross-and-Lozenge
evidence: stylistic analysis of the two kings’ coinage of this type,
led him to conclude that the perceived latest examples in the
collection, feature only Ceolwulf. Therefore, he argued, there are
grounds to conclude that a political shift occurred in the late
870s that led to London’s moneyers’ no longer minting coins
for Alfred.38 This conclusion also corroborates my argument that
Ceolwulf chose in c.877 (or rather was coerced into choosing) a
side in the ongoing confrontation between Alfred and the Vikings
because, if the relationship between the two kings soured, their
monetary union, particularly their sharing of London moneyers,
would have become untenable. Unfortunately, Watlington hoard
evidence cannot yet be used to modify this conclusion, as similar
stylistic analysis of the much-expanded corpus of Cross-andLozenge type coins is required.39
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The battle of Edington and its aftermath represent the
opaquest point of rupture in Alfred and Ceolwulf ’s relationship.
There is no mention of Ceolwulf in literary sources after this
date; we can only conjecture based on evidence from coinage and
conclusions concerning Ceolwulf ’s trajectory up to this point.
Coinage evidence is difficult to pin down. The Watlington hoard
may be dated, as Williams and Naylor do, to c.879-80 based on
the presence of a single coin of the Two-Line type which itself was
probably first issued c.879-80—and a lack of later coins in the
hoard.40 Even if this date of deposition is accurate, it is unknown
why the hoard’s contents were deposited and by whom. The
method of basing conclusions on what may have happened in
the years before Edington is decidedly unsatisfactory because the
late ninth century was a time in which all manner of misfortune
might befall a ruler. As Asser described, King Alfred was himself
wracked from the day of his wedding with a strange and painful
illness.41 Moreover, there is no record of Ceolwulf ’s age or health
during his reign, and his sudden departure from the historical
record may conceivably reflect a development beyond the agency
of Alfred or the Vikings.
The above analysis entails a summary of the sequence of
developments in the relationship between Alfred and Ceolwulf
from c. 874 to c. 879. Based on numismatic evidence in the
form of the Two Emperors type, Ceolwulf probably managed to
consolidate power in 874 in the aftermath of Burgred’s deposition
and his own accession to the Mercian throne to reassert a
significant degree of control over London, which he probably
shared to some extent with King Alfred.42 Ceolwulf was most
likely recognized as a king by most people from c.874 to c.877, as
Ceolwulf ’s surviving charters seem to demonstrate, particularly
the 875 charter for the diocese of Worcester.43 It is difficult to
argue that this recognition of Ceolwulf as a king in his own
right continued after 877, when, based on the Chronicle’s 877
entry, the Vikings probably forced him to divide the kingdom
of Mercia between themselves.44 Numismatic evidence suggests
20
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that Ceolwulf ruled London to Alfred’s exclusion after 877 while
continuing to style himself as king of Mercia on the coinage
he issued.45 Thus, there are grounds to conclude that Alfred
and Ceolwulf enjoyed somewhat positive relations as superior
and inferior rulers, respectively, while they jointly issued coins
in London up to the 877 sharing of Mercia. After the sharing,
however, when Ceolwulf established himself as the sole ruler of
London, it appears this monetary union, and possibly any sense
of goodwill that existed between them, had ended. Finally, what
transpired between the two kings following the battle of Edington
is at present impossible to establish, as insufficient evidence exists
regarding Ceolwulf from c.877-80.
The argument that I have posited, that there are grounds
to believe Ceolwulf ’s neighbours recognized him as a king prior
to the 877 sharing of Mercia, aligns with Keynes’ conclusion
that Alfred and Ceolwulf enjoyed "mutual (if unequal) respect
as rulers of ‘English’ England" in the mid-870s.46 Keynes reached
this conclusion mainly based on the Cross-and-Lozenge type
coins available to him, though his inferences based on the two
Two Emperors coins available to him were probably accurate.47
Indeed, as evidenced by the number of Two Emperors coins in
the Watlington hoard, the two kings probably jointly issued
the type until c.875-6, when they also issued the rebased Crossand-Lozenge coinage. This joint production probably continued
until 877, the year Ceolwulf aligned with the Vikings to Alfred’s
exclusion and became the sole issuer of Cross-and-Lozenge coins.48
The conclusions Blackburn drew from his stylistic analysis of
Cross-and-Lozenge coins inform my own conclusions regarding
Ceolwulf ’s 877 alignment with the Vikings. However, my pre877 chronology, which argues for a relationship between Alfred
and Ceolwulf in this period that was possibly characterized
by cooperation, opposes the first part of Blackburn’s own
chronology.49 Based on pre-Watlington numismatic evidence,
he concluded that London was under Alfred’s sole control from
Ceolwulf ’s 874 accession until 877, when Ceolwulf assumed
Penn History Review
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control of the city with Viking help.50 I argue that Blackburn
was mistaken about the kings’ relationship in this period because
he largely disregarded both Two Emperors coins of which he was
aware and based his findings on the Cross-and-Lozenge type
coins to which he had access. However, I find the second part of
Blackburn’s chronology convincing: that the Cross-and-Lozenge
evidence points to a shift in the control of London toward
Ceolwulf as the sole ruler of the city following Alfred’s 876-7
confrontation with the Vikings.51 I argue that the 877 treaty of
Exeter and subsequent sharing of Mercia probably precipitated
this shift, although knowing whether Ceolwulf excluded Alfred
from London for reasons germane to his own exercise of power
or that he did so at the behest of the Vikings is impossible.

9th-century Silver Halfpenny

My conclusions contradict Haslam’s model for Ceolwulf ’s
reign. As stated above, I find Haslam’s comprehensive view of
Ceolwulf ’s reign inappropriate given the available sources. For
example, I diverge from Haslam in my analysis of Alfred and
Ceolwulf ’s relationship after the 877 sharing of Mercia. Haslam
offered a detailed sequence of events in which Ceolwulf ’s
alignment to Viking interests and disregard for those of Alfred
facilitated a Viking occupation of London as part of a broader
Viking settlement of Mercia that supposedly began in c. 875 and
continued through 877.52 Haslam’s claim that Viking sharings
occurred in both 875 and 877 rests solely on an interpretation
of Æthelweard’s Chronicle and the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle's
individual accounts of sharing as two separate instances of
land allotment.53 As argued above, these supposedly separate
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accounts probably describe the same sharing event. Æthelweard
was probably mistaken regarding the sharing’s placement within
the grander chronology of events, so it appears unlikely that the
Vikings engaged in the two-part sharing which Haslam argues.
Similarly, Nelson’s argument that the West Saxons and
Mercians possibly cooperated at the battle of Edington does not
depend on enough information to be convincing.54 She bases
her conclusion on a charter from Edward the Elder’s reign that
references the forfeiture of land by a West Saxon ealdorman,
Wulfhere, in which "all the councillors of the [West Saxons] and
of the Mercians]" judged him guilty for desertion. Whitelock
attests this charter’s genuineness but adds that it is contained in
only one cartulary.55 Nelson argues that the "obvious explanation
is that a West Saxon/Mercian alliance held good… surely,
in 878" based on a reading of the post-Exeter events of 877,
namely the sharing of Mercia, as developments to the expense of
Ceolwulf ’s position resulting from his "alliance" with Alfred.56
This argument, including the notion that in 878 Ceolwulf was
still Alfred’s ally, elides the fact that Ceolwulf appears to have
excluded Alfred from London after 877. Moreover, it seems
unlikely Ceolwulf would have turned against the Vikings had
they retained hostages from c.874 that Ceolwulf would not have
been willing to part with—on top of the oaths he had made to
the Vikings and which, if we are to judge the charter Nelson cites
as authentic, Ceolwulf ’s contemporaries took very seriously.
Ceolwulf and the Vikings
I aim to describe Ceolwulf ’s relationship with the
Vikings along the three points of rupture I identified as the 874
accession of Ceolwulf to the Mercian throne, the 877 sharing
of Mercia, and the 878 battle of Edington. The challenge that
arises in this endeavour is that accounts of interactions between
Ceolwulf and the Vikings are entirely contained in sources that
probably originated in Alfred’s court. Once again, the issue of
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the retrospective nature of Alfred’s sources must be considered,
as should Pratt’s addition that the Alfredian milieu that probably
composed the sources was itself inimical to positive portrayals of
Ceolwulf.57 It is important also to remember that the Chronicle
and its derivatives mention Ceolwulf in conjunction only with
the 874 and 877 points of rupture that I have identified and not
with the 878 battle of Edington nor the events that followed.
Both the Chronicle and Asser’s Life describe Ceolwulf ’s
nomination as Mercian king by the same Vikings who evicted
King Burgred. Each source describes the supposed terms of
Ceolwulf ’s oath to the Vikings; Asser wrote, “[Ceolwulf ] gave
hostages to them under the terms of this arrangement, and
he swore that in no way would he wish to countermand their
intentions, but would be obedient in all respects.”58 The Chronicle
adds that Ceolwulf also swore to hand over as much of Mercia
as the Vikings wished whenever they wished, suggesting that the
new king was a puppet of his Viking overlords.59 This view of
Ceolwulf is softened somewhat by the king’s 875 charter discussed
above as well as Æthelweard’s account of 874.60 As stated above,
I have interpreted this charter’s lack of Viking and West Saxon
witnesses as a sign that Ceolwulf ’s contemporaries in southern
England possibly viewed him as a fellow, if inferior, ruler. That
Ceolwulf felt confident providing rights in perpetuity to entities
such as the diocese of Worcester suggests he did not consider it
likely that his Viking overlords would ask him to give them his
entire kingdom at a moment’s notice. A regnal list from Worcester
that Keynes highlighted and that allotted Ceolwulf a five-year
reign (874-9) opens the possibility that Ceolwulf may have owed
his legitimacy to more than the Vikings’ support.61 Instead, as
Abels has suggested, Ceolwulf may have been a member of the
same dynasty as the first king of his name, Ceolwulf I (821-3)
and his predecessor Cenwulf (796-821).62 Thus, Ceolwulf may
have been more than a pliant noble whom the Vikings elevated.
Consequently, there are grounds to view Ceolwulf ’s elevation
as a continuation of established royal norms with the probable
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precedent-breaking additions that the Vikings presided in large
part over his accession and secured his loyalty through the taking
of hostages and the swearing of certain oaths.
For his part, Æthelweard makes no mention of oaths
by Ceolwulf. All he says about the king in his translation of a
lost version of the original Chronicle is that "At that time [in
874 following Burgred’s departure] Ceolwulf held the kingdom
of the Mercians."63 Moreover, it is useful to reiterate my stance
that Æthelweard’s description of the Vikings’ 875 sharing of "the
kingdom for themselves into two shares" did not, as Haslam
argued, possibly indicate a sharing of Mercia itself but rather
was a mistaken attribution of the event to 875 instead of 877.64
Æthelweard’s account therefore did not claim that Ceolwulf
made agreements with the Vikings involving oaths or hostages
to secure the Mercian throne. I advocate for a middle path
concerning these oaths and hostages between the extremes of
Æthelweard on the one hand and the Chronicle and Asser on the
other: Ceolwulf did perhaps owe his position to the Vikings in
some way, though his agreement with them was not as extensive
as Asser and the Chronicle made it appear.65 The possible shifts in
the control of London around 877 that Blackburn observed in
the corpus of Cross-and-Lozenge type coinage from c.875-c.878
may indicate some aspects of Ceolwulf ’s relationship with the
Vikings around 877.66 As I have said, the possible cessation of
production of Alfred’s Cross-and-Lozenge coinage points to the
possibility that, after the 877 sharing of Mercia, Ceolwulf had
to choose a side in the confrontation between Alfred and the
Vikings.67 He chose the Vikings to whom he apparently owed
his throne, who possibly threatened and/or carried out violence
against his eventual share of the kingdom, and who probably still
held hostages of his.
Additionally, Æthelweard’s account of 877 in Mercia
provides grounds that the Vikings did not enjoy the full authority
over Mercian lands which the Chronicle claims Ceolwulf had
sworn to them in 874.68 It also bolsters the case that Ceolwulf
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viewed himself and was viewed by his contemporaries as a king in
his own right.69 Æthelweard’s description of the Vikings’ ravaging
Mercia in 877 may be interpreted as follows: after having agreed
to a treaty at Exeter with Alfred, the Vikings were forced to
leave empty-handed, and the army’s leaders needed some way
to appease their probably disgruntled followers. Appeasement in
the form of Mercian land may have been the next logical step
for the Viking leadership, though some coercion was required
to convince Ceolwulf to hand over the north-eastern half of his
domain. The results of this coercion in the form of "ravag[ing] the
kingdom of the Mercians" would have probably been movable
wealth in the hands of the Viking rank-and-file, the promise of
Mercian tribute, and an agreement providing for the Vikings’
settlement of north-eastern Mercia.70 Moreover, Ceolwulf would
probably have been left in a weakened position following the
Viking ravaging, making his possible decision to become an
accessory to further Viking operations a pragmatic one. This
scenario represents a useful construction of a possible sequence of
events because it shows how the rupture of 877 may have taken
place without the Vikings’ initially having installed Ceolwulf as
a plenipotentiary who served at their whim. Instead, Ceolwulf
aligned with the Vikings and away from Alfred while ceding the
north-eastern half of his kingdom to the Vikings. At any rate, the
combination of primary sources points to c.877 as a time when
Ceolwulf began to act more to the benefit of Viking interests and
to the exclusion of Alfred’s.
Because Ceolwulf is not mentioned in written sources
following the 877 sharing of Mercia, it is impossible to
convincingly discuss the Mercian king’s relationship with the
Vikings after the battle of Edington, the third point of rupture
in this period. Any number of misfortunes may have befallen
Ceolwulf after the 877 sharing of his kingdom. The appearance
of a Viking army in 879 at Fulham, the city upriver of London
that Ceolwulf possibly continued to hold up to around the
battle of Edington, provides grounds to consider the possibility
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that Ceolwulf was no longer in control of London and, by
extension, no longer ruled Mercia.71 Then again, there is also
the possibility that this army sought to work in concert with the
Viking army that had lately been defeated. Thus, Ceolwulf, an
ally of the Vikings-at-large, allowed the Fulham army to travel
safely upriver of London. It also seems possible that the Fulham
army and the incumbent Vikings whom Alfred had defeated
were hostile because the Chronicle reports that the latter’s 880
movement to settle East Anglia coincided with the former’s
departure for Francia.72 Keynes suggests that the incumbent
Vikings’ encampment for a year at Cirencester may have had
something to do with Ceolwulf ’s "apparent demise" c.879.73

Map of Routes of the Viking Armies

Williams and Naylor concur, arguing that the deposition of the
Watlington hoard was probably connected to Viking ravaging
conducted while based at Cirencester.74 However, to conclude
that the Vikings, to whom Ceolwulf had sworn oaths and who
may have still held hostages from him, liquidated their possible
ally after losing to Alfred means deriving a significant conclusion
from the narrative sources’ silence. Moreover, the scholars’
assumption that the Vikings deposited the Watlington hoard
is one that should not be considered as firmly as the authors
present it.75 Again, the hoard might well have been left by locals
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who wished to protect their possessions from nearby raiders for
a variety of reasons; soldiers, even ones with friendly leaders,
are still capable of stealing from the locals, a fact that may not
have been lost on said locals. As unsatisfactory as it sounds, there
simply does not appear to be enough evidence to piece together a
coherent narrative following the battle of Edington or in locating
the causes of Ceolwulf ’s departure from the scene.
In summary, the nature of Ceolwulf ’s relationship with
the Vikings around the three points of rupture I have identified
possibly proceeded in a way that accorded with the development
of his relationship with King Alfred. That is, there are grounds
to conclude that, in 874, the Vikings helped elevate Ceolwulf to
the Mercian throne and established him as a supporter of theirs
by taking hostages and having the new king swear oaths. The
nature of these oaths and hostages is difficult to ascertain because
of discrepancies between the narrative sources, which either
detail in full the kinds of oaths that Ceolwulf may have made
along with the importance of the hostages—or fail to mention
anything of the sort. A compromise between the narrative sources’
accounts and surviving documentary sources in the form of an
875 charter points to the possibility that from c.874 to c.877,
Ceolwulf ’s peers in southern England probably viewed him as
a ruler of equivalent standing.76 Furthermore, the 877 sharing
of Mercia possibly signals a new order in southern England in
which Ceolwulf aligned with the Vikings to Alfred’s exclusion.
The possible cessation of Alfred’s minting in London suggests
that Ceolwulf assumed sole control of the city in connection
to his alignment with the Vikings. The root of this possible
decision is difficult to parse from the lack of consensus among
the Chronicle and its derivatives, which either state that the
Viking devastation of Mercia took place in the same year as the
sharing of the kingdom or make no mention whatsoever of such
violence. Numismatic evidence and some compromise among
the Chronicle and its derivatives do appear to be convincing
that Ceolwulf possibly assumed sole control of London c.877,
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signalling a turn toward the Vikings and away from the West
Saxon king. As for the nature of Ceolwulf ’s relationship with the
Vikings in the aftermath of their loss at the battle of Edington,
nothing can be said with certainty. The 879 context of southern
England in which the Fulham army and the incumbent Vikings
camped astride an ascendant Wessex is too vague to determine
the motivations of the parties involved and the ways in which
they affected Ceolwulf.
Secondary literature makes little mention of Ceolwulf ’s
relationship with the Vikings except for the suggestion by
some that the Vikings’ 879 stay at Cirencester contributed to
Ceolwulf ’s downfall. For its part, the Chronicle reports that, after
making peace with Alfred in 878, Guthrum’s army travelled
to Cirencester, where it stayed a year before leaving for East
Anglia.77 Williams and Naylor argue that perhaps the deposition
of the Watlington hoard coincided with the move to East Anglia
and further argue the hoard is of Viking origin, implying that
the hoard probably represents a part of the Vikings’ loot from
conflict with Ceolwulf during the stay at Cirencester.78 It is
perhaps more likely, however, that locals instead deposited this
hoard. Moreover, there is little ground to support the authors’
conclusion that Guthrum’s yearlong 879 stay at Cirencester
"must have been devastating for Ceolwulf ’s position" because we
know almost nothing about the political context of southwestern
Mercia by the time of the battle of Edington, much less over a
year later.79 The simultaneous presence of another Viking army
upriver of London at Fulham suggests that Ceolwulf was either in
dire straits, receiving friendly Viking reinforcements, or perhaps
out of the picture.80 Therefore, the authors’ conclusions regarding
the Vikings’ 879 stay at Cirencester need not be considered likely.
My assessment of Ceolwulf ’s status among Alfred and
the Vikings as a fellow ruler of southern England between c.874
and c.877 agrees with Nelson’s conclusion that Ceolwulf was "far
more than the mere Danish puppet-ruler implied by the AngloSaxon Chronicle."81 However, my conclusions regarding the state
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of Ceolwulf ’s relationship with the Vikings diverge from her
argument that Ceolwulf and the Mercians over whom he ruled
by 878 possibly fought alongside Alfred against the Vikings.82
Nelson based this argument on a 901 charter from Edward
the Elder’s reign that references a council at which both West
Saxon and Mercian officials witnessed the official forfeiture of a
certain Wulfhere’s land.83 Even if one ignores the probable nature
of Ceolwulf ’s accession to the Mercian throne as at least under
Viking auspices, it does not appear possible that the Mercian king
restored the "West Saxon/Mercian alliance."84 It appears instead
that his reasons for siding with the Vikings in c.877 probably
included the oaths that he had sworn to them, the hostages of
his they held, and their ravaging of his land. This last point had
possibly left him too weak to continue ruling without allying
with one of his more powerful neighbours. That Ceolwulf appears
to have excluded Alfred from London as a possible consequence
of the sharing of Mercia indicates that he probably picked the
Viking side in 877. Furthermore, since Ceolwulf received negative
treatment in the Chronicle, a source probably created in Alfred’s
court based on Whitelock and Keynes’ conclusions, it does not
appear at all likely that Ceolwulf disappeared from historical
view c. 879 as a friend of the West Saxons.85 Additionally, I agree
with Whitelock that the Chronicle’s intended audience probably
would have been aware of the events of the 870s. This audience
would thus have been surprised beyond the bounds of their
willing suspension of disbelief to see Ceolwulf maligned as a
"foolish king’s thegn" had he not turned his back in 877 on any
friendly agreements he may have had with Alfred.86
My model of Ceolwulf ’s reign contradicts Haslam’s far
more intricate model of the fate of London during the period.
Haslam argues that there are significant grounds to conclude that
the Vikings occupied London after the 877 sharing of Mercia.
He argues based on a reading of Æthelweard’s 875 account
of the sharing of the Viking kingdom to explain Blackburn’s
finding that London’s moneyers ceased to produce coins for

30

Brent Weisberg

Alfred the Great and Ceolwulf II

Alfred after 877.87 Haslam builds this case on assumptions that
do not stand on solid ground. Haslam considers Æthelweard’s
875 sharing a separate event from the Chronicle’s 877 sharing,
an assumption I argue above should be replaced by considering
the supposedly dual sharings as a single event.88 I argue that
the discrepancy of dating between the sources can probably be
chalked up to a chronological mistake by Æthelweard. Haslam
also assumed that the intentions and interests of the three sides,
Alfredian, Ceolwulfian, and Viking, could be considered almost
as primary sources of their own.89 The issues with driving one’s
analysis of events during Ceolwulf ’s reign with musings on each
ruler’s view of the purported activities of the others are twofold:
first, the lens through which we view such intentions is, in all
probability,ultimately one of Alfred’s construction; second, it is
misleading and rash to try to piece together the motivations of
people who lived nearly 1150 years before our time and whose
context, individual quirks, and goals are lost to us. We may, as
Pratt does, conclude something approaching Alfred’s goals and
motivations through examination of the considerable body of
literary sources left from his reign which were probably composed
by him and his court, but the same cannot be said either for
Ceolwulf or the Vikings who probably put him in power.90
Conclusion
The picture of King Ceolwulf II of Mercia that emerges
from my analysis is one of a king who initially managed to take
advantage of the lull in conflict between his two greater neighbours
in order to cultivate positive relationships with them and secure
his status as a fellow king. The changing political circumstances
of southern England in 876-7 then probably forced Ceolwulf
to side with his initial sponsors, the Vikings, who took the
opportunity in c.877 to share Mercia between themselves and
him. Then Ceolwulf ’s story trails off unsatisfactorily: the 878
battle of Edington may have led to myriad outcomes in terms of
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both Ceolwulf ’s fate and his relationships with his neighbours.
For all we know, Ceolwulf may have stepped down as his
predecessor had and then lived in obscurity long after 878.
New evidence, such as the Watlington hoard find, helps
to contest prior conclusions regarding the changing state of
London during Ceolwulf ’s reign and thus provides a window
into his relationships with his neighbours. It appears likely that,
from 874 to 877, Ceolwulf and Alfred continued the monetary
union which Ceolwulf ’s predecessor Burgred had with Alfred.
This finding provides reasons to view Alfred’s relationship
with Ceolwulf as positive and may itself corroborate the notion
that Ceolwulf acted, viewed himself, and was viewed as a king
in his own right during this period. This conclusion should be
tempered by accounts in the Chronicle and Asser’s Life, however,
which claim that Ceolwulf swore oaths to the Vikings and gave
them hostages in exchange for his throne.91 Yet, as Æthelweard
rarely appears to have been mistaken in his translation of a lost
version of the Chronicle, his lack of mention of oaths and hostages
erodes the certainty that the Vikings had the kind of leverage
on Ceolwulf from 874 onward that would have placed him
under their control before 877.92 After 877, the year Ceolwulf
apparently consented to the sharing of Mercia, it appears possible
that a mixture of the ravaging that Æthelweard described as well
as oaths and hostages that Asser and the Chronicle described led
to Ceolwulf aligning with the Vikings. Numismatic evidence
may indicate that Ceolwulf excluded Alfred from London as
part of with his alignment with the Vikings.93 I have assumed,
in the lineage of Whitelock and Keynes, that the Chronicle
and Asser’s Life were probably composed in Alfred’s court and
probably remained consistent with the West Saxons’ memory
of the events of Ceolwulf ’s reign.94 In all likelihood, Alfred and
his officials viewed Ceolwulf negatively by the 890s and recorded
him that way because of his later alignment with the Vikings
and, as Pratt suggests, his narrative expediency as a foil to Alfred’s
"language of wealth and wisdom."95 Ceolwulf appears to have
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been a figure who straddled two eras: one in which the Vikings
ran rampant through England, slowly conquering it from north
to south, and one in which the House of Wessex reconquered
those lands. Unfortunately, this king of ambiguous allegiance,
origin, and demise left a mere glimmer of his story to us, and
our accounts of him pertain to the latter era, when the writers
of history could categorize their protagonists into winners and
foolish king’s thegns.
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